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Abstract The legal framework pertaining to the use of private armed guards
protecting merchant ships from Somalia-based piracy is complex, sometimes
ambiguous, and currently in a state of ﬂux. Against the background that
commercial shipping increasingly relies on Private Maritime Security
Companies and that various regulatory projects on the subject matter are
underway, this article sketches out what domestic and international rules
govern the use of force and ﬁrearms by private armed guards on board
merchant ships today. It concludes that at this juncture an eﬀort to coordinate
this legal framework is necessary, both regarding the interpretation of existing
rules and the creation of new norms.
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I. A PRIVATE RESPONSE TO PROTECT VULNERABLE SHIPS FROM PIRATE ATTACKS
Somali-based pirates have managed to establish a unique and proﬁtable
business model: hijacking vessels and kidnapping their crews for the sole
purpose of extorting a large ransom. Since 2008, they have taken over 3000
seafarers hostage.1 The ransom amount demanded has increased steadily since
then2 and, as of 2011, is estimated to be at almost ﬁve million USD per vessel
and crew.3 The international community’s response to the scourge of piracy is
multifaceted. Among the many actions taken to disrupt Somali-based pirate
activity, the Security Council set up an ad hoc legal framework allowing for
unimpeded law enforcement in Somali territorial waters and on its mainland,
* Faculty of Law, University of Basel, anna.petrig@unibas.ch.
1 H-G Ehrhart and K Petretto, ‘The EU and Somalia: Counter-Piracy and the Question of a
Comprehensive Approach: Study for the Greens/European Free Alliance’ (Hamburg,
February 2012) 4, 8, 33 <www.greens-efa.eu/ﬁleadmin/dam/Documents/Studies/Ehrhart_
Petretto_EUandSomalia_2012_ﬁn.pdf> accessed 22 February 2013.
2 UNODC, ‘The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat
Assessment’ (Vienna, 2010) 199.
3 A Bowden and S Basnet, ‘The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011: Working Paper One
Earth Future Foundation’ (2012) 11 <oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/ﬁles/economic_
cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf> accessed 22 February 2013.
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which complements the pre-existing counter-piracy enforcement regime for
the high seas.4 At the operational level, not only are there an unprecedented
number of national and multinational missions contributing to the regional law
enforcement operation, but the quest to suppress Somali-based piracy and
armed robbery at sea has received a truly international response with States
around the globe deploying assets and personnel.5
The strategy of using naval presence and retaliatory force to prevent and
deter pirate attacks has been relatively successful. It has proven eﬀective in the
Gulf of Aden, where a security corridor was established, and along the closely
patrolled Somali coastline.6 The number of attacks in this region has been
signiﬁcantly reduced. Also, the percentage of successful attacks by Somali
pirates dropped from 50 per cent in 2008 to a mere 12 per cent in 2011. This,
however, should not obscure the fact that the overall number of attempted
attacks by Somali-based pirates is still growing,7 partly due to a ‘crowding-out’
eﬀect that has forced pirate operations into other maritime regions.8 Pirates
now operate at distances of up to 1750 nautical miles oﬀ the coast of Somalia
and within a geographical area of approximately 2.8 million square nautical
miles.9 This is made possible largely through the use of (often previously
hijacked) ocean-going vessels, so-called mother ships, which are able to carry
several skiﬀs, weapons and fuel, thus allowing for increased autonomy.10
Hence, Somali pirates have yet again demonstrated their ability quickly to
adapt their strategy in response to counter-piracy measures.11
As a response to the ever-expanding area within which attacks take place,
the operational area of the patrolling naval forces has also been extended.
For instance, the operational area of the European Union Naval Force
(EUNAVFOR, also known as ‘Operation Atalanta), currently covers two
million square nautical miles, which is equivalent to 1.5 times the size of
mainland Europe.12 Despite the vast extent of this patrol zone, EU Member
4 R Geiss and A Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for
Counter-Piracy Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Oxford University Press 2011)
55–85.
5 UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1950
(2010)’ (25 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/662, paras 39–47; UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on Specialized Anti-Piracy Courts in Somalia and Other States in the Region’ (20 January
2012) UN Doc S/2012/50, para 9.
6 UNSC, ‘Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to
Piracy oﬀ the Coast of Somalia’ (25 January 2011) UN Doc S/2011/30, paras 25 and 28.
7 Ehrhart and Petretto (n 1) 33.
8 UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Specialized Anti-Piracy Courts in Somalia’ (n 5)
para 9.
9 UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Specialized Anti-Piracy Courts in Somalia’ (n 5)
para 9. 10 UNODC (n 2) 198.
11 UNSC, ‘Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to
Piracy oﬀ the Coast of Somalia’ (n 6) para 25.
12 EUNAVFOR, ‘Operation Atalanta’ (2012) 4 <www.eunavfor.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/
08/20120912_Informationbroschure_english.pdf> accessed 22 February 2013.
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States have not increased the naval forces deployed.13 On the contrary, in 2011,
the economic crisis aﬀecting several of the principle EU contributor States
resulted in a growing reluctance to deploy assets to counter Somali-based
piracy.14 On average, EUNAVFOR has ﬁve vessels and two patrol aircraft on
patrol.15 Force generation is also a pressing problem for national missions16
and, at present, is an especially acute problem for NATO’s Operation Ocean
Shield, which has only two or three vessels deployed at any given time.17
The imbalance between the expanding operational area and the scarcity of
available resources to combat Somali-based piracy makes it increasingly
diﬃcult for patrolling naval forces to fulﬁl their mandate to protect vulnerable
ships from pirate attacks—however eﬃciently they perform their duties.18 Two
years after the EUNAVFOR mission commenced, a self-assessment found that
‘strategically, a naval presence is not deterring the pirates’,19 and consequently,
important adjustments occurred on the operational level and in the shipping
industry. Two adjustments in particular bear mentioning. First, the deter-and-
disrupt strategy has expanded its directed attention to include not only pirate
activity at sea, but piracy on land as well. In March 2012, the Council of the
European Union extended Operation Atalanta’s area of operation to include
Somali coastal territory and internal waters. Less than two months later, the
ﬁrst disruptive action against pirate supplies on the Somali coast took place—
referred to as Disruption of Pirate Logistic Dumps (DPLD).20 Second, the
strategy has shifted away from primarily trying to secure the piracy-infected
maritime area to also protecting vulnerable vessels. There are two possible
means of protecting vulnerable objects at sea: the public solution of using
so-called Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) or, alternatively, relying on
the services of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs).
VPDs are small teams of law enforcement oﬃcials embarked on board
merchant ships to protect them from pirate attacks. They are fundamentally
diﬀerent from PMSC personnel because VPD teams are comprised of
uniformed State oﬃcials acting within their capacity as military or law
enforcement agents, are subject to disciplinary procedures and are authorized
to execute the State’s monopoly on the use of force. Since 2010, EUNAVFOR
13 Ehrhart and Petretto (n 1) 35. 14 Ehrhart and Petretto (n 1) 35.
15 Ehrhart and Petretto (n 1) 35; EUNAVFOR, ‘Operation Atalanta’ (n 12).
16 Ehrhart and Petretto (n 1) 35.
17 N Gros-Verheyde, ‘L’opération Ocean Shield en peine de navires’ (26 July 2012) <www.
bruxelles2.eu/piraterie-maritime/loperation-ocean-shield-en-peine-de-navires.html> accessed 22
February 2013.
18 Ehrhart and Petretto (n 1) 34–5; UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Specialized
Anti-Piracy Courts in Somalia’ (n 5) para 9.
19 EUNAVFOR, ‘European Union’s Naval Force Counter-Piracy operation enters its 3rd year
as an extension to 2012 is conﬁrmed’ (15 December 2010) <eunavfor.eu/european-unions-
naval-force-counter-piracy-operation-enters-its-3rd-year-as-an-extension-to-2012-is-conﬁrmed-2/>
accessed 22 February 2013.
20 EUNAVFOR, ‘Operation Atalanta’ (n 12) 4.
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sporadically uses VPDs to protect World Food Programme ships21 and also
trains soldiers from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as
VPDs.22 While some European States are reluctant to deploy VDPs—notably
for legal and budgetary reasons—France, Spain, Belgium, Italy and the
Netherlands oﬀer commercial shipping companies the option to hire VPDs.23
The Netherlands has opted to protect Dutch-ﬂagged ships with VPDs because
under Dutch law the use of PMSCs on board private ships is prohibited.24 Thus
far, the Netherlands has deployed 26 VPD teams and planned to deploy 100
teams each of ten persons during 2012, and to increase the number of teams to
175 in 2013.25 Further, since 2009, the Russian Navy sporadically deploys
VPDs, and Indonesia (which has 76000 citizens employed as seafarers) is
currently considering oﬀering VPD services.26 While industry representatives
express a strong preference for VPDs over private armed guards, resources are
limited.27 As a result, civilian shipping companies do rely on the services of
PMSCs. It is estimated that between 15 and 35 per cent of vessels currently
transiting the area where Somali-based pirates are active rely on armed
guards.28 Some authors conclude from discussions with leading shipping
industry representatives that the number of vessels employing armed guards
has increased considerably and that by the end of 2011 the ﬁgure was closer to
50 per cent.29
Certainly, the fact that private contractors are protecting commercial ships
from criminal activity is a challenge to the idea that a State’s coastguard and
21 Ehrhart and Petretto (n 1) 37; J Brown, ‘Pirates and Privateers: Managing the Indian Ocean’s
Private Security Boom’ (September 2012) 9 < lowyinstitute.cacheﬂy.net/ﬁles/brown_
pirates_and_privateers_web.pdf> accessed 22 February 2013.
22 EUNAVFOR, ‘EU NAVFOR Trains AMISOM Vessel Protection Detachment Troops’
(9 February 2012) <eunavfor.eu/eu-navfor-trains-amisom-vessel-protection-detachment-troops/>
accessed 22 February 2013.
23 Brown (n 21) 10; N Ronzitti, ‘The Use of Private Contractors in the Fight against Piracy:
Policy Options’ in F Francioni and N Ronzitti (eds), War by Contract: Human Rights,
Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford University Press 2011) 44–5.
24 Government of the Netherlands, ‘The Netherlands Increases its Protection of Merchant
Vessels of the Kingdom’ (Press Release, 11 October 2011) <www.government.nl/documents-and-
publications/press-releases/2011/10/07/the-netherlands-increases-its-protection-of-merchant-vessels-
of-the-kingdom.html> accessed 22 February 2013 (Government of Netherlands, VPDs); Brown
(n 21) 9. 25 Brown (n 21) 10. 26 Brown (n 21) 9.
27 UK House of Commons – Foreign Aﬀairs Committee, ‘Piracy oﬀ the Coast of Somalia:
Tenth Report of Session 2010–12’ (5 January 2012) 20 <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201012/cmselect/cmfaﬀ/1318/131802.htm> accessed 22 February 2013.
28 UK House of Commons, ‘Piracy oﬀ the Coast of Somalia’ (n 27) 7 (15–35 per cent);
A Thorp, ‘Preventing and Prosecuting Piracy at Sea: Legal Issues: Standard Note 6237’ (28
February 2012) 21 <www.parliament.uk/brieﬁng-papers/sn06237.pdf> accessed 22 February
2013 (15–25 per cent); INCE & Co, ‘Piracy –Armed Guards Revisited and General Overview’
(2012) < incelaw.com/ourknowledge/publications/piracy-armed-guards-revisited-and-general-
overview> accessed 22 February 2013 (35 per cent); C Ménard and J-C Viollet, ‘Rapport
d’information par la commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées sur les societies
militaires privées’ (Assemblée Nationale, 14 February 2012) <www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/
rap-info/i4350.asp#P455_118562> accessed 22 February 2013 (30 per cent).
29 Bowden and Basnet (n 3) 17.
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naval forces are the main providers of security at sea.30 This is one of the main
reasons why the very idea of having PMSCs on board merchant ships or
relying on their escort services to provide protection against potential pirate
attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean region was initially met with
considerable scepticism. Indeed, the ‘Best Management Practices to Deter
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Oﬀ the Coast of Somalia’, issued by the
Commission of the European Union in 2010, stipulated that whilst the use of
security guards was at the discretion of the company, it was not recommended.
This was endorsed by 16 diﬀerent international industry representatives,
among them the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
(Intertanko), the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the Baltic
and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the International Group of
Protection and Indemnity Clubs (IGP&I) and the International Maritime
Bureau (IMB).31
However, the belief that PMSCs play a major role in protecting merchant
ships, in addition to VPDs, has gained considerable acceptance since then.
Many actors have now endorsed the use of private armed guards on board
merchant ships transiting the High Risk Area, or take at least a neutral stance.
Due to the heavy reliance on PMSCs by commercial ships and mounting
pressure from the shipping industry for guidance on the proper use of PMSCs,
the IMO has striven to regulate the use of private armed contractors on board
merchant ships.32 Yet, at the same time, the IMO recommendations on the use
of PMSCs ‘are not intended to endorse or institutionalize their use’.33 BIMCO,
the largest of the international shipping associations representing a group of
shipowners that control roughly 65 per cent of the world’s tonnage and with
members in more than 120 countries, follows an equally pragmatic approach.
BIMCO has a preference for the use of armed government-provided VPDs
since this resolves a number of liability and legal issues, albeit with the same
physical risk. Nevertheless, while emphasizing that the decision whether or not
to employ private guards on board merchant vessels is an operational one to be
made by its members, it supports the use of armed guards as a supplement to
the non-lethal Best Management Practices which it recommends, but only after
a detailed risk assessment. It also stresses that the use of PMSCs must be seen
as a temporary measure lasting only until governments fulﬁl their responsi-
bility to protect crews and ships from pirate attacks and that an unnecessary
30 N Florquin, ‘Escalation at Sea: Somali Piracy and Private Security Companies’ in Small
Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2012: Moving Targets (Cambridge University Press 2012) 204.
31 ‘Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and oﬀ the Coast of
Somalia’ (Version 2, August 2009) annexed to Commission Recommendation of 11 March 2010
on measures for self-protection and the prevention of piracy and armed robbery at sea [2010] OJ
L67/13, art 2(b)(vii). 32 See below n 40.
33 IMO, ‘Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States Regarding the Use of Privately
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area’ (25 May 2012)
MSC.1/Circ.1406/Rev.2, Annex, r 1 (IMO Flag State Recommendations).
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proliferation of PMSCs and their institutionalization must be avoided.34
A change in attitude can also be witnessed among national shipowner
associations. For instance, the German Shipowner Association (Verband
Deutscher Reeder) initially opposed the use of PMSCs, arguing that state
forces should protect their vessels, but since 2011 they now support the use of
PMSCs on board merchant ships.35 Finally, ﬂag State policies and laws
concerning the use of private armed guards on board merchant ships vary
greatly. They range from an outright prohibition in France and Japan36 to the
position of the United States which recommends the use of PMSCs on board
ships ﬂying their ﬂag, arguing that no ship equipped with armed guards has
ever been the subject of a successful pirate attack. Thus, US authorities are
reportedly working closely with industry and transit countries to make it less
burdensome for PMSC personnel to transit foreign ports with weapons
intended for the defence of ships. In line with this approach, a national policy
encouraging countries to allow commercial ships transiting high-risk waters to
have armed security teams on board has been adopted.37
The increased use of PMSCs to protect commercial shipping from pirate
attacks has triggered legal reform at various levels. A number of States which
currently prohibit the use of armed guards on board merchant ships, or which
do not have any PMSC-speciﬁc rules in place, are reviewing their legislation.38
As to soft law, a series of initiatives have been launched to create new
guidelines on the use of PMSCs. The IMO, for example, adopted three sets of
interim recommendations on the use of PMSCs in 2011: one set for ﬂag States,
one for port and coastal States, and another for shipowners, ship operators and
shipmasters, which were all revised in May 2012.39 At the same time, the
IMO issued new interim guidance designed to complement the three sets of
34 BIMCO, ‘BIMCO’s Position: Piracy, Armed Robbery, Kidnapping, Torture and Murder at
Sea’ (November 2011, last updated March 2012) <www.bimco.org/en/About/Viewpoint/
03_Piracy.aspx> accessed 22 February 2013.
35 K Berkenkopf, ‘German Shipowners Threaten Flag Exodus in New Anti-Piracy Row’
(Lloyd’s List, 26 January 2012).
36 Oceans beyond Piracy, ‘Introduction to Private Maritime Security Industry’ (2011) 8 <http://
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/ﬁles/pmsc_map_ﬁnal.pdf> accessed 22 February 2013
(OBC, Introduction to PMSCs) [see generally for an overview on Flag States’ stance on PMSCs].
37 R Abeyratne, ‘The Use of Armed Guards on Board Merchant Vessels’ [2012] Journal on
Transportation Security 3 [citing AJ Shapiro, ‘Remarks to the Defense Trade Advisory Group’
(US Department of State, 9 November 2011) <www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/176925.htm> accessed
22 February 2013].
38 For a compilation of various PMSCs ﬂag State laws and legal reform projects, see
International Chamber of Shipping, ‘Comparison of Flag State Laws on Armed Guards and Arms
on Board Vessels’ (updated June 2012) <www.ics-shipping.org/ICS-ECSA%20Private%20Armed
%20Guards%20Flag%20State%20Laws%20June%202012.pdf> accessed 22 February 2013 (ICS,
Flag State Law Comparison).
39 IMO Flag State Recommendations (n 33); IMO, ‘Revised Interim Recommendations for
Port and Coastal States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel On
Board Ships in the High Risk Area’ (25 May 2012) MSC.1/Circ.1408/Rev.1, Annex (IMO Port and
Coastal State Recommendations); IMO, ‘Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship
Operators, and Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel On
672 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002058931300016X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:26:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
recommendations.40 Meanwhile, Working Group 3 of the Contact Group on
Piracy oﬀ the Coast of Somalia is about to draft comprehensive guidelines on
the use of privately contracted armed security personnel.41 As to regulations on
the use of force, Working Group 3 consulted and cooperated with the IMO,
which is indicative of a general desire to synthesize the guidance given
to the shipping industry.42 The United Kingdom43 and India44 have also
adopted guidelines. Further, shipping organizations such as BIMCO, ICS,
INTERCARGO, Intertanko and OCIMF45 and several insurance associations46
have also issued guidelines. BIMCO recently drafted the standard contract
GUARDCON, which aims to harmonize PMSCs terms of engagement
and thus limit the legal uncertainty that comes from PMSCs being hired
under diﬀering contractual terms.47 These maritime (or rather piracy)
speciﬁc instruments complement existing general soft law on PMSCs. The
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC)48
is of considerable importance since, among those companies that have signed
it, 48 per cent specialize in maritime security and 18 per cent oﬀer maritime
Board Ships in the High Risk Area’ (25 May 2012) MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2, Annex (IMO
Shipowner Recommendations).
40 IMO ‘Interim Guidance to Private Maritime and Security Companies Providing Privately
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area’ (25 May 2012)
MSC.1/Circ.1443, Annex (IMO PMSC Guidance).
41 UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1950
(2010)’ (n 5) para 24. 42 Information on ﬁle with author.
43 UK Department for Transport, ‘UK Interim Guidance to UK Flagged Shipping on the Use of
Armed Guards to Defend Against the Threat of Piracy in Exceptional Circumstances’ (Version 1.1,
November 2011, updated June 2012), <assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/use-of-armed-guards-to-
defend-against-piracy/use-of-armed-guards-to-defend-against-piracy.pdf> accessed 22 February
2013 (UK Interim Guidance on PMSCs).
44 Government of India, ‘Shipping Ministry Issues Guidelines for Deployment of Armed
Guards in Merchant Ships’ (Press Information Bureau, 29 August 2011) <www.pib.nic.in/newsite/
erelease.aspx?relid=75281> accessed 22 February 2013; H Devineni, ‘Summary of Indian
Ministry of Shipping Guidelines on Deployment of Armed Security Guards on Merchant Ships’
<oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/ﬁles/indian_policy_armedguards.pdf> accessed 22 February
2013 (Indian PMSC Guidelines).
45 See eg ‘Industry Guidelines for the Use of Private Maritime Security Contractors (PMSC)
as Additional Protection in Waters Aﬀected by Somali Piracy’ (May 2011) <psm.du.edu/media/
documents/industry_initiatives/industry_guidelines_for_use_of_private_maritime_security_
contractors_somali_piracy.pdf> accessed 22 February 2013 (Industry Guidelines).
46 See eg The Norwegian Shipowners’Mutual War Risk Insurance Association, ‘Guidance on
the Selection of Private Security Companies (PSC)’ (29 March 2011) <www.warrisk.no/ﬁlestore/
Sirkulrer_og_informasjon_til_medlemmer/PSCGuidanceMaypdf.pdf> accessed 22 February 2013
(Norwegian PMSC Guidelines).
47 BIMCO, ‘GUARDCON’ <www.bimco.org/Chartering/Documents/Security/GUARDCON.
aspx> accessed 22 February 2013; The Shipowners’ Protection Limited, ‘BIMCO GUARDCON
contract for the employment of security guards on vessels’ (March 2012) <www.shipownersclub.
com/media/377127/bimcoguardconcontractfortheemploymentofsecurityguardsonvesselsmarch2012.
pdf> accessed 22 February 2013.
48 Confédération Suisse, ‘International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers’ (9 November 2010) <www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_
CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.pdf> accessed 22 February 2013 (ICoC).
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services among other services.49 The ICoC not only applies to security services
provided on land but also to those provided at sea, this ﬂowing from reading
Rule 13 (which provides that the code applies to security services provided in
Complex Environments) together with the deﬁnition of ‘Complex
Environments’ in Section B (which refers to ‘any area’ rather than ‘any
territory’). Furthermore, Rule 7 states that the signatories will consider the
development of ‘additional principles and standards for related services, such
as . . . the provision of maritime security services’. The word ‘additional’ in
Rule 7 can be understood as referring to other rules as well as to the principles
and standards set out in the ICoC itself.50 This conclusion is, however, diﬀerent
from that of the IMO which, whilst accepting that the ICoC is a ‘useful
reference point for PMSCs’, takes the view that it was drafted ‘only for land-
based security companies, and is therefore not directly applicable to the
peculiarities of deploying armed guards on board merchant ships to protect
against acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea’.51
Many of the rules on the use of PMSCs specify that they should have access
to competent maritime legal advice at all times, given ‘the imprecise position
of armed guards under various national jurisdictions and international law’52
and ‘the complexity of applicable laws concerning the carriage and use of
ﬁrearms and security-related equipment on board merchant ships’53. Indeed,
the legal framework relating to the protection of merchant ships from pirate
attack by private armed guards is complex, ambiguous, and currently in a state
of ﬂux. The following sections aim to provide an overview of the rules relating
to arms and other security-related equipment used by PMSCs, such as
communication equipment, and the powers of PMSC personnel. The question
of whether the master of a ship with PMSC personnel on board must render
assistance to other merchant ships in distress or to alleged pirates at risk of
drowning will also be addressed, as will be the relationship between the master
of a ship and PMSC personnel. Finally, consideration will be given to whether
coastal and port States can pursue violations of their criminal law by PMSCs
and their personnel.
49 T Haueter, ‘Countering Piracy: What Are the Rights and Obligations of States and Private
Security Providers?’ (Wilton Park Conference, ‘Countering Piracy: What Are the Rights and
Obligations of States and Private Security Providers?’, 30 January–1 February 2012) [quoted with
permission]. The ﬁgures are based on self-declaration by the companies and were not veriﬁed by
DCAF.
50 A Priddy and S Casey-Maslen, ‘Counter-Piracy Eﬀorts and Operations: Law and Policy
Issues’ (draft dated 13 January 2012, Background Paper for the Wilton Park Conference,
‘Countering Piracy: What Are the Rights and Obligations of States and Private Security
Providers?’, 30 January–1 February 2012).
51 IMO PMSC Guidance (n 40) r 2.1.
52 UK Interim Guidance on PMSCs (n 43) r 3.2.
53 IMO PMSC Guidance (n 40) r 3.3.2.
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II. ISSUES RELATED TO ARMS AND OTHER SECURITY-RELATED EQUIPMENT USED
BY PMSCS
The legal issues pertaining to the procurement, embarkation, disembarkation,
carriage, and on-board management of arms and security-related equipment by
PMSCs are most probably more diﬃcult than those relating to the use of force
by PMSC personnel. Public information on the types and quantities of arms,
including ammunition, consumables, spare parts and maintenance equipment,
and security-related material used by PMSCs, such as communication
equipment, is scarce.
PMSCs do not rely on a standard ‘weapon kit’. Some use a single type of
ﬁrearms whilst others rely on a combination of several specialized weapons.
PMSCs that equip their personnel with a single type of ﬁrearm most commonly
use assault riﬂes or shotguns. The range of this type of weapon does not exceed
300 to 400 metres at sea. The strategy of these PMSCs is primarily to deter
attacks, an eﬀect oﬀered by the mere presence of armed guards, prompting the
alleged pirates to refrain from an attack and to seek softer targets. Often the
decision on which type of weapon to rely on is the result of strict port, coastal
or ﬂag State law limiting the types of weapons that can be carried on board
their ships or on ships navigating in their waters. PMSCs using a combination
of more specialized arms generally equip their personnel with weapons having
a range of 20 to 1200 metres, such as pistols and shotguns (20 metres), light
machine guns (400 to 600 metres), general purpose machine guns and sniper
riﬂes (1000 to 1200 metres). Having such a variety of weapons allows for both
a more graduated and an earlier response.54
A. The Plethora of Applicable Legal Frameworks
The use of armed private security personnel on board merchant ships gives rise
to a range of legal issues. They pertain, inter alia, to the procurement and
movement of weapons by PMSCs, to requirements regarding the embarkation
and disembarkation of arms and/or of armed guards, and to conditions
pertaining to the on-board carriage, storage and management of weapons.55
These are usually addressed by domestic law such as arms regulations, export,
import and custom provisions, and/or laws speciﬁcally dealing with PMSCs.
In the absence of a system of harmonized domestic law or of comprehensive
international rules on the use of armed guards on board merchant ships, the
matter is, then, subject to—often diﬀering— domestic legal requirements. The
result is a patchwork of domestic law which may apply cumulatively and/or
consecutively, depending upon the actual locus of the ship.
54 Florquin (n 30) 207–8. More on a graduated response in the present context, see below at
section 3B.
55 Legal frameworks and rules pertaining to the use of ﬁrearms are discussed below at
section 3B.
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Arms and armed guards on board ships navigating the high seas are
primarily governed by the law of the ﬂag State. Ships have the nationality of
the State whose ﬂag they are entitled to ﬂy.56 Among other functions, the
nationality of a ship indicates which State is permitted and obliged57 under
international law to exercise its jurisdiction, namely to prescribe and enforce
rules.58 Thus, through the concept of nationality, the vessel is attached to a
particular State whose law is applicable on board.59 Consequently, on the high
seas, it is the law of the State whose ﬂag the merchant vessel using PMSCs
is ﬂying which governs issues relating to arms. Flag State law on the
procurement, movement, carriage and on-board management of arms by
PMSC personnel varies considerably, ranging from very permissive rules to
outright prohibitions of embarking arms and/or armed guards on board
merchant ships.60 Especially in jurisdictions without PMSC-speciﬁc legis-
lation in place, general rules govern arms and armed guards on board merchant
ships. The application of general rules potentially results in legal uncertainty or
does not provide for satisfactory outcomes. In Germany, for instance, in the
absence of PMSC-speciﬁc rules, armed guards were mainly governed by the
trade regulation act (Gewerbeordnung) and the weapons law (Waﬀengesetz)
neither of which was drafted with a view to their applying to private armed
guards embarked on merchant vessels for the purpose of defence against pirate
attack. On the one hand, the criteria stipulated by the trade regulation act for
PMSCs to enter the regulated market is quite low and therefore did not allow
for eﬃcient vetting and certiﬁcation of companies.61 On the other hand,
the weapons law is too restrictive to permit PMSCs to be equipped with the
‘weapon kit’ necessary for a graduated and eﬃcient response to pirate
attacks.62 Against this background, shipowners have threatened to ﬂag out their
ships or not return to the German ﬂag until speciﬁc PMSC legislation is
56 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982) 1883 UNTS
3 (UNCLOS) art 91(1), 2nd sentence.
57 UNCLOS (n 56) art 94; on the ﬂag State’s obligation to exercise its jurisdiction, see R-J
Dupuy and D Vignes, A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea, vol 1 (Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers
1991) 405–6; a State not regulating the use of PMSCs on board its ships may violate this provision.
58 UNCLOS (n 56) art 92(1).
59 Dupuy and Vignes (n 57) 401; D König, ‘Flag of Convenience’, The Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online edition) paras 16–17 <www.mpepil.com>
accessed 22 February 2013.
60 On the diﬀering national concepts, see ICS, Flag State Law Comparison (n 38).
61 D König and T René Salomon, ‘Private Sicherheitsdienste auf Handelsschiﬀen – Rechtliche
Implikationen’, PiraT-Arbeitspapiere zur Maritimen Sicherheit Nr 2 (March 2011) 25–30 <www.
maritimesecurity.eu/de/publikationen/workingpapers.html> accessed 22 February 2013 (König
and Salomon, Private Sicherheitsdienste); D König et al, ‘Piraterie und maritimer Terrorismus als
Herausforderungen für die Seesicherheit: Objektive Rechtsunsicherheit im Völker-, Europa- und
deutschem Recht’, PiraT-Arbeitspapiere zur Maritimen Sicherheit N. 7 (July 2011) 38–42 and 62
<www.maritimesecurity.eu/de/publikationen/workingpapers.html> accessed 22 February 2013
(König, Rechtsunsicherheit).
62 König and Salomon, Private Sicherheitsdienste (n 61) 30–1; König, Rechtsunsicherheit
(n 61) 43–4.
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enacted which clariﬁes the situation.63 As a response, the German legislature
adopted a legal reform project on the use of armed private guards on board
merchant ships amending the trade regulation act and weapons law, which will
enter into force on 1 August 2013.64 Other European States, namely Greece
and Cyprus, also adopted PMSC-speciﬁc regulations recently.65
In addition to ﬂag State law, PMSCs and their personnel may be obliged to
observe, regulations of the State where the company is incorporated.66 Thus,
for example, Article 8 of the Draft Swiss Federal Law on Security Services
Provided Abroad67 obliges security service providers to respect the ICoC. The
ICoC, in turn, contains rules on the management of weapons68 and weapons
training.69 A PMSC and/or its personnel on board a merchant vessel navigating
the high seas is thus potentially bound by several laws at the same time which
may contain diﬀering and/or conﬂicting rules on arms. Even though Article 92
UNCLOS requires that ships shall sail under one ﬂag (and consequently one
law) only, a pragmatic approach can be taken by providing that both laws and
policies must be respected, as do shiprider70 clauses to solve a similar conﬂict
of laws instance.71
If a commercial ship relying on private armed guards passes through the
territorial waters of a third State or calls into port in a foreign State, compliance
with coastal and port State laws and regulations on arms must also be ensured,
and these may again diﬀer from the relevant law of the ﬂag State.72 As will be
seen below, whether the coastal State may regulate the use of arms and/or
armed guards on board foreign merchant exercising the right of innocent
passage within its territorial sea73 cannot be determined with certainty at this
juncture.74 Nevertheless, some States surrounding the piracy-infected area,
63 Berkenkopf (n 35).
64 Bundesrat, Gesetz zur Einführung eines Zulassungsverfahrens für Bewachungsunternehmen
auf Seeschiﬀen, Drucksache 12/13, 11 January 2013 <www.bundesrat.de/SharedDocs/
Beratungsvorgaenge/2013/0001-0100/0012-13.html> accessed 22 February 2013.
65 For Greece, see Law No 4058: provision of security services by armed guards to commercial
ships and other provisions <www.hcg.gr/sites/default/ﬁles/docs/archive/n4058y2012eng.pdf>
accessed 22 Feburary 2013; for Cyprus, see Law No 77/2012: The Protection of Cyprus Ships
against Acts of Piracy and Other Unlawful Acts Law of 2012 <www.mcw.gov.cy/mcw/dms/dms.
nsf/marsecvessels_en/marsecvessels_en?OpenDocument#11> accessed 22 February 2013.
66 IMO PMSC Guidance (n 40) r 1.3.2.
67 ‘Loi fédérale sur les prestations de sécurité privées forunies à l’étranger (LPSP)’ (2011)
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/Switzerland/LPSP.pdf> accessed 22
February 2013. 68 ICoC (n 48) rr 56–8.
69 ICoC (n 48) r 59.
70 Put simply, shipriders are law enforcement oﬃcials of State A who are embarked on a law
enforcement vessel of State B.
71 On potential conﬂicts of law arising from the use of shipriders and how they are practically
solved, see Geiss and Petrig (n 4) 90–2.
72 König, Flag of Convenience (n 59) paras 31 and 37; IMO PMSC Guidance (n 40) r 1.3.3.
73 M Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoﬀ 2007) 39–40.
74 On innocent passage, see below at section 2B1.
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through whose territorial seas merchant ships with PMSC personnel on board
may potentially pass have regulated the issue.75
A special regime applies to the Suez Canal, which provides a likely passage
route for merchant ships which are utilizing PMSCs to protect from Somali-
based piracy. The Canal is subject to the 1888 Convention Respecting the Free
Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal (Constantinople Convention).76 Article
1 of the Constantinople Convention sets out the basic principle that the
‘Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open . . . to every vessel of
commerce . . . without distinction of ﬂag. Consequently, the high contracting
parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the canal . . . .’
Article 13 of the Constantinople Convention reﬂects the balance struck
between the rights and powers retained by Egypt with regard to operation of
the Canal and the right of free passage granted to all ships. It stipulates that,
except for the obligations expressly provided by the treaty, the sovereign rights
of Egypt are in no way aﬀected.77 Concretely, Egypt, as the territorial State
having sovereignty over the Canal, has regulatory power regarding navigation
and safety but it has to respect the basic principle of the Constantinople
Convention, this being the free use of the Canal by all nations. What
regulations and measures are permissible is to be determined on an ad hoc
basis, taking into account general rules on treaty interpretation and applicable
standards regarding the safety of navigation.78
With regard to weapons and armed guards on board foreign ships, the Suez
Canal Authority ﬁrst decided that vessels transiting the Canal should hand over
all weapons to the local authorities, who would return them upon completion
of the transit. In August 2011, the Egyptian Ministry of Defence went a step
further, prohibiting all vessels transiting the Canal from having any type of
weapons and armed guards on board. All ships were to make a declaration to
the competent local authorities that they did not have any weapons or armed
guards on board while transiting the Canal. Contravention could imply
criminal liability under the Egyptian laws concerning the possession of
unlicensed weapons. After consultations between the Ministry of Defence, the
Ministry of Transport and the Suez Canal Authority, it was decided not to
apply this regulation given its negative impact on shipping through the Suez
Canal and the diﬃculties related to its implementation. Instead, it was decided
that transiting vessels must submit a letter certiﬁed by the ﬂag State, which
provides, inter alia, details of all weapons, ammunition and the number of
75 See below at section 2B2.
76 Reprinted in AJIL Supplements 3 (1909) 123–7.
77 M Arcari, ‘Suez Canal’, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online
edition) para 9 <www.mpepil.com> accessed 22 February 2013 (Arcari).
78 Arcari (n 77) para 21.
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armed guards on board, as well as conﬁrmation that weapons and ammunition
will not be used during the vessel’s presence in the Canal.79
In sum, depending on the locus of the ship, diﬀerent sets of rules apply to the
question of whether, and under which circumstances, arms and/or armed
guards are allowed on board merchant ships. These rules may not only diﬀer
and/or contradict each other, but their interpretation by domestic authorities
often cannot be anticipated with a suﬃcient degree of certainty. This holds
particularly true with regard to the rules pertaining to innocent passage, to
which we turn now.
B. Arms and Innocent Passage
Ships of all States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea of third States.80 The term ‘passage’ includes
traversing the territorial sea without entering internal waters, or proceeding to
or from internal waters.81 The concept of innocent passage, which is laid down
in Articles 17 to 32 of UNCLOS and reﬂects customary law82, is a cornerstone
of the law of the sea. With regard to PMSCs, two questions ﬂow from the
regime on innocent passage. First, does the simple presence of armed private
security service providers on board a merchant ship and/or the use of arms in
self-defence constitute a non-innocent activity? Second, is the coastal State
allowed to regulate or even prohibit the use of armed guards on board merchant
ships within the rather strict conﬁnes imposed by UNCLOS with regard to the
regulation of innocent passage by the coastal States?
1. Non-innocent activity?
Passage is qualiﬁed as ‘innocent’ so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order, or security of the coastal State.83 If a ship engages in non-innocent
activities, it becomes subject to the full enforcement powers of the coastal
State, which can take the necessary steps to prevent passage which is no longer
79 Egyptian Marine Insurance Consultations & Services (EMICS), ‘Piracy –Weapons and
Armed Guards on board vessels transiting the Suez Canal’ (on ﬁle with author); Gard, ‘Gard Alert,
Egypt/Suez Canal – new instructions regarding weapons and armed security guards onboard
commercial vessels’ (November 2011) <www.gard.no> accessed 22 February 2013 and ‘Gard
Alert, UPDATE – Instructions regarding weapons and armed security guards onboard commercial
vessels in Egypt’ (December 2011) <www.gard.no> accessed 22 February 2013.
80 UNCLOS (n 56) art 17.
81 UNCLOS (n 56) art 18(1); R Churchill and A Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea
(Manchester University Press 1999) 81–2; H Yang, Jurisdiction of the Coastal State Over Foreign
Merchant Ships in Internal Waters and the Territorial Sea (Springer 2006) 148–9; K Hakapää,
‘Innocent Passage’, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online edition)
para 6 <www.mpepil.com> accessed 22 February 2013.
82 Hakapää (n 88) para 43; Yang (n 81) 143–5.
83 UNCLOS (n 56) art 19(1).
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innocent.84 This means that a ship can be stopped, inspected and diverted from
the territorial sea or detained and forced to a coastal port for the institution of
legal proceedings.85
Article 19(2) UNCLOS contains a catalogue of activities rendering passage
ipso facto non-innocent.86 The ﬁrst activity listed is ‘any threat or use of force
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the
coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’.87 Article
19(2) UNCLOS contains a catalogue of activities rendering passage ipso facto
non-innocent.88 The ﬁrst activity listed is ‘any threat or use of force against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State,
or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’.89 The wording of this sub-
paragraph of Article 19(2) UNCLOS is modelled after Article 2(4) UN
Charter,90 which prohibits the use of force by one State against another and
applies between States only.91 Consequently, Article 19(2)(a) UNCLOS,
which restates the UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of force as regards
ships,92 is basically addressed to warships and government ships used for non-
commercial purposes.93 Hence, the ﬂag State is obliged under this provision
(as it is already by virtue of the UN Charter)94 to ensure that its ships will
refrain from such threats or use of force.95 Merchant ships therefore fall outside
the scope of Article 19(2)(a) UNCLOS. Even if, arguendo, they were covered
by the provision, the simple presence of PMSC personnel on board merchant
ships does not represent a threat of force—as in the case of a warship whose
mere presence does not amount to a ‘threat or use of force’ for the purposes of
84 UNCLOS (n 56) art 25(1).
85 Churchill and Lowe (n 82) 87–8; Hakapää (n 82) para 19.
86 It suﬃces that a ship engages in one of these activities in order to render passage non-
innocent; whether or not the activity involves a violation of coastal State law is not decisive:
Churchill/Lowe (n 81) 86; Yang (n 81) 164.
87 UNCLOS (n 56) art 19(2)(a).
88 It suﬃces that a ship engages in one of these activities in order to render passage non-
innocent; whether or not the activity involves a violation of coastal State law is not decisive:
Churchill/Lowe (n 81) 86; Yang (n 81) 164.
89 UNCLOS (n 56) art 19(2).
90 Dupuy and Vignes (n 57) 914; Yang (n 81) 164.
91 A Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2’ in B Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations:
A Commentary, vol I (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2002) para 28; O Dörr, ‘Prohibition of Use
of Force’, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online edition) paras 26 and
30 <www.mpepil.com> accessed 22 February 2013.
92 SN Nandan and S Rosenne (eds), ‘Volume II, Articles 1 to 85’ in MHNordquist (ed),United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers 1993)
174–5, para 19(10)(c) (UNCLOS Commentary Vol II); D Anderson, Modern Law of the Sea
(Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers 2008) 143. 93 Yang (n 81) 164.
94 UNCLOS Commentary Vol II (n 92) 174, para 19(10)(c).
95 Yang (n 81) 164.
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Article 19(2)(a) UNCLOS.96 Further, the most important exception to the
prohibition of use of force is individual and collective self-defence.97
Therefore, even if PMSCs were to fall within the ambit of Article 19(2)(a)
UNCLOS, the use of force in self-defence would not amount to a prohibited
form of use of force.
Article 19(2)(b) UNCLOS further lists ‘any exercise or practice with
weapons of any kind’ as a non-innocent activity.98 As with sub-paragraph (a),
this provision is generally not relevant to merchant ships.99 Even if commercial
ships were covered by the provision, it hardly encompasses the mere presence
of armed guards on board merchant ships100 since the notions of ‘exercise’ and
‘practice’ seem to require some kind of activity (as does the introductory
sentence of Article 19(2) UNCLOS which says that passage will be considered
prejudicial if it ‘engages in any of the following activities’).101 Further, the
wording ‘exercise or practice with weapons’ suggest that it does not include the
use of arms in self-defence.102 This follows from a comparison with Article
25(3) UNCLOS where it is stipulated that the coastal State can temporarily
suspend innocent passage in speciﬁc areas of its territorial sea for the
protection of its security, including ‘weapons exercises’.103 The notion clearly
refers to the active use of force. Generally, the same term is not used in diﬀerent
ways in the same legal instrument and thus the notion of ‘exercise . . . with
weapons’ in Article 19(2)(b) UNCLOS cannot be read as encompassing self-
defence measures. A systematic reading of Article 19(2)(b) UNCLOS also
leads to the conclusion that it requires a hostile activity, similar to all other
activities listed in sub-paragraphs (b) to (g), which follow the general clause in
sub-paragraph (a) prohibiting ‘any threat or use of force’.104 The use of armed
force in self-defence or defence of others by PMSC personnel is thus not an
active hostile use of force as required by the wording ‘any exercise or practice
with weapons of any kind’.
Further, ‘the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft’ is also
considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal
State.105 The term ‘any aircraft’ must be understood broadly, including both
state aircraft and civil aircraft.106 Some PMSCs are equipped with helicopters
or small aircraft, such as ACADEMI107 whose vessel McArthur features a
96 Anderson (n 92) 143. 97 Randelzhofer (n 91) para 48.
98 UNCLOS (n 56) art 19(2)(b). 99 Yang (n 81) 164.
100 König and Salomon, Private Sicherheitsdienste (n 61) 12.
101 Churchill and Lowe (n 81) 85. 102 Yang (n 81) 164.
103 UNCLOS Commentary Vol II (n 92) 175, para 19(10(d) [where Articles 19(2)(b) and 25(3)
UNCLOS are mentioned together].
104 E Beckert and G Breuer, Oeﬀentliches Seerecht (Walter de Gruyter 1991) 115, para 309;
UNCLOS Commentary Vol II (n 92) 175, para 19(1)(d) [stating that sub-paragraph (b) is related
with sub-paragraph (f) of Article 19(2) UNCLOS].
105 UNCLOS (n 56) art 19(2)(e).
106 UNCLOS Commentary Vol II (n 92) 175, para 19(10)(f).
107 The PMSC was formerly known under the names Blackwater and later Xe: J Ukman,
‘Ex-Blackwater Firm Gets a Name Change, Again’ The Washington Post (12 December 2011)
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helicopter deck.108 Launching, landing or taking on board such aircraft while
in the territorial waters of a third State would violate Article 19(2)(e)
UNCLOS. An exception seems to be, again, self-defence.109 Another non-
innocent activity, listed in Article 19(2)(g), UNCLOS which is of potential
relevance to the use of private armed guards for protecting commercial
shipping is ‘the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person
contrary to the customs, ﬁscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of
the coastal State’.110 Therefore, embarkation or disembarkation of arms and
PMSC personnel while in the territorial sea of a third State must only be made
in accordance with the coastal State’s laws on such matters.
The catalogue of non-innocent activities in Article 19(2) UNCLOS
concludes with a general reference to ‘any other activity not having a direct
bearing on passage’.111 This broad clause provides coastal States with
considerable discretion in determining which activities render passage non-
innocent.112 Attempts during the drafting process to narrow down the scope of
this open-ended sub-paragraph failed. The International Chamber of Shipping
proposed deleting the sub-paragraph, arguing that the catch-all provision
would undermine the basic structure of the provision since it could be used by
any State to prevent innocent passage and thereby restoring the uncertainty
which it was designed to remove. If deleting the provision was unacceptable, it
proposed amending it to read ‘any similar activity not having a direct bearing
on passage’.113 This change in wording should have ensured that the ejusdem
generis rule of interpretation would be applied. However, neither the deletion
nor the amendment of the provision received suﬃcient support.114 The travaux
préparatoires are only a supplementary means of interpreting an international
treaty;115 sub-paragraph (l) can still be construed as being narrower than the
drafting history might suggest. Since the object and purpose of the provisions
on innocent passage is to strike a balance between coastal and maritime
interests,116 the sub-paragraph should be interpreted to reﬂect the basic idea
enshrined in Article 19(1) UNCLOS, which is that ‘Passage is innocent for so
<www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/ex-blackwater-ﬁrm-gets-a-name-
change-again/2011/12/12/gIQAXf4YpO_blog.html> accessed 22 February 2013; ACADEMI,
‘Leading Training and Security Service Provider Xe Services Announces Name Change to
ACADEMI’ (Press Release, 12 December 2011) <www.academi.com/press_releases/1>
accessed 22 February 2013.
108 J Seper, ‘Blackwater Joins Fight against Sea Piracy’ The Washington Post (4 December
2008) <www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/04/blackwater-joins-ﬁght-against-sea-piracy/?
page=all> accessed 22 February 2013. 109 Ronzitti (n 23) 48.
110 UNCLOS (n 56) art 19(2)(g). 111 UNCLOS (n 56) art 19(2)(1).
112 The clause compromises to a large extent the exhaustive character of the list of non-innocent
activities provided in art 19(2) UNCLOS (n 56): Dupuy and Vignes (n 57) 913.
113 Emphasis added.
114 UNCLOS Commentary Vol II (n 92) 171, para 19(6); 173, para 19(7); 173–4, para 19(8);
174, para 19(9).
115 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (entered into force on 27 January 1980) 1155
UNTS 331, art 32. 116 Hakapää (n 81) para 44.
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long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State.’ Thus, even if an activity does not have a direct bearing on passage, it
should only be qualiﬁed as non-innocent if it violates one of the three interests
mentioned in Article 19(1) UNCLOS.117
Article 19(2) UNCLOS leaves coastal States with considerable discretion to
decide what kind of activities are non-innocent.118 Still, a reasonable argument
can be made for not qualifying the mere presence of armed guards on board
merchant ships and the use of force and ﬁrearms in self-defence as non-
innocent activities. Arguably, the kind of ship or the fact that it is armed should
not be decisive when determining whether its passage is non-innocent. Rather,
the ship and its internal economy, coupled with the character and manner of the
passage should be determinative. This ﬂows from the phrase in Article 19(1)
UNCLOS that ‘passage shall take place’ coupled with the list of activities
deemed innocent in Article 19(2) UNCLOS.119 Thus, as long as the external
acts of a vessel engaged in passage do not threaten the coastal State’s peace,
good order or security, passage should be qualiﬁed as innocent.120 What is
more, the concrete activities mentioned in Article 19(2) UNCLOS suggest that
an abstract and a priori determination of non-innocence, for example, due to
speciﬁc cargo being embarked on a ship, is not allowed.121 The same argument
could be made for the embarkation of arms and armed guards on board private
ship for self-defence purposes. Finally, since even nuclear-powered vessels and
ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances are
allowed to exercise the right of innocent passage if they carry the necessary
documents and conform to internationally agreed precautionary measures,122 it
seems diﬃcult to argue that the simple presence of arms or armed guards on
board a private ship is a non-innocent activity. However, Article 19(2)
UNCLOS, and especially the general clause at the end of the catalogue, leaves
coastal States with a considerable margin of interpretation. In the light of
this legal uncertainty, it would be desirable to see the coastal States in the
region prone to Somali-based piracy cooperating by moving towards a uniﬁed
interpretation of the meaning of innocent passage as found in Article 19
UNCLOS with regard to the use of PMSCs on merchant ships.
117 However, some authors suggest that sub-paragraph (l) dispenses with the need for the coastal
State to prove that in the speciﬁc case in question its peace, good order or security are threatened:
see eg W Vitzthum, ‘Maritimes Aquitorium und Anschlusszone’ in W Vitzthum (ed), Handbuch
des Seerechts (CH Beck 2006) 124, para 123.
118 B-O Bryde, ‘Militärische und sicherheitspolitische Implikationen der neuen
Seerechtskonvention’ in Jost Delbrück, Das neue Seerecht (Duncker & Humblot 1984) 174.
119 D Guilfolyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press
2009) 242.
120 See eg Beckert and Breuer (n 104) 117, paras 314(a) and 314(b) [referring to the Okinawa
incident and arguing that towing a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine, which went on ﬁre on the
high seas, through Japanese territorial waters was in line with UNCLOS for it is the manner of the
ship and not its features or armament which is decisive for qualifying whether passage is innocent].
121 Vitzthum (n 117) 124, para 123.
122 UNCLOS (n 56) art 23; see eg Churchill and Lowe (n 81) 76.
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2. Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to innocent passage
The second question to consider with regard to innocent passage and the use of
armed guards on board merchant ships is whether coastal States are allowed
under Article 21 UNCLOS, which limits the coastal State’s competence to
adopt rules on innocent passage, to regulate or even outlaw the use of armed
PMSC personnel on board commercial ships.
Article 21 UNCLOS limits the coastal State’s power to adopt laws and
regulations relating to innocent passage in two ways.123 First, Article 21(2)
UNCLOS limits the coastal State’s power to regulate the ‘design, construction,
manning or equipment of foreign ships’ unless these domestic provisions give
eﬀect to generally accepted international rules or standards.124 As regards
PMSCs, it is the ‘manning of ships’ which is most relevant. The rationale
behind prohibiting the coastal State from enacting regulations on the manning
of ships (unless they give eﬀect to generally accepted international standards) is
to ‘protect the integrity of global maritime navigation’:125 if every coastal State
were free to enact its own manning standards, the resulting plethora of
(potentially conﬂicting) coastal State laws would hamper the freedom of
navigation.126 It follows that the prohibition mainly relates to manning
standards which a ship cannot adjust during a voyage127 and which would, de
facto, deprive a ship of its right of innocent passage. However, private
contractors can, at least theoretically, be disembarked for certain periods of
passage and ﬁrearms can be stored and sealed either on board the merchant
ship itself whilst it is passing through foreign territorial waters or they could
even be transferred to a ship remaining on the high seas that functions as
an arms depot.128 Therefore, the use of armed guards is, arguably, not an
unchangeable circumstance, and so coastal State regulation is not per se
precluded by Article 21(2) UNCLOS.129
Second, Article 21 UNCLOS limits the coastal State’s competence to adopt
laws and regulations to speciﬁc subject matters, one of which is the ‘safety of
navigation and the regulation of maritime traﬃc’130 and ‘the prevention of
infringements of the customs . . . laws and regulations of the coastal State’.131
123 Churchill and Lowe (n 81) 91; König, Flag of Convenience (n 59) para 37.
124 UNCLOS (n 56) art 21(2).
125 UNCLOS Commentary Vol II (n 92) 175, para 21(11)(f).
126 D Nelson, ‘Maritime Jurisdiction’ in The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law (online edition) para 11 <www.mpepil.com> accessed 22 February 2013; Beckert and Breuer
(n 104) 116, para 313.
127 König and Salomon, Private Sicherheitsdienste (n 61) 13.
128 See section 2C regarding other practices to avoid a potential violation of law.
129 König and Salomon, Private Sicherheitsdienste (n 61) 13.
130 UNCLOS (n 56) art 21(1)(a).
131 UNCLOS (n 56) art 21(1)(h). The subject matter listed in sub-paragraph (b), (c), (d), (e), (f)
and (g) of art 21 UNCLOS are not relevant to the use of armed guards on board merchant and so are
not considered further here.
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The provision further requires that these rules be in conformity with the
provisions of UNCLOS and other rules of international law.132 The use of
armed guards arguably does not fall within the ambit of ‘safety of navigation
and regulation of maritime traﬃc’. The term ‘safety of navigation’, which
also appears in other provisions of UNCLOS,133 refers, inter alia, to the
construction, equipment, labour conditions and seaworthiness of the ships134
and thus does not really relate to private security on board commercial ships.
The coastal State also possesses prescriptive power regarding innocent passage
and ‘the prevention of infringement of the customs . . . laws and regulations of
the coastal State’.135 Therefore, measures aimed at ensuring that arms on board
private ships passing though territorial waters conform with customs laws and
regulations seem to be allowed.
It is doubtful whether, in theory, the prescriptive power of the coastal State
to regulate arms on board merchant ships extends beyond customs matters
under Article 21 UNCLOS. This contrasts with the practice of various coastal
States which do broadly regulate the use of arms and/or armed guards on board
commercial ships passing through their territorial waters. For example, Saudi
Arabia declared that merchant ships in its waters are permitted to carry
weapons for the purpose of self-defence. While not specifying the maximum
calibre of weapons allowed for such purposes, it requires the master of the ship
to furnish a list specifying the arms and ammunition carried prior to its arrival
in the territorial waters. Further, weapons must be kept in storage and sealed by
Saudi oﬃcials, and these seals may only be broken once the ship leaves Saudi
waters.136 While some States ban weapons altogether from their territorial
waters, Oman limits the type of arms allowed on board merchant ships to semi-
automatic weapons.137 Oman has also recently introduced the restriction that
vessels may only hold arms for 96 hours. The State has been criticized both for
imposing unrealistic conditions and for constantly changing its require-
ments.138 In South-East Asia, States have enacted regulations prohibiting the
passage of merchant ships with armed PMSC personnel on board in their
territorial waters unless a certain sum of money is paid. For instance, the formal
policy in Malaysia is that any PMSC wishing to operate in its territorial waters
must apply for a permit from the Ministry of Internal Security, and PMSCs
found in Malaysian waters without a permit will be detained and the crew
132 UNCLOS (n 56) art 21(1), introductory sentence.
133 See UNCLOS (n 56) arts 22(1)(a), 39(3)(a), 42(1)(a), 60(3) and 225.
134 See eg art 34 of the International Law Commission’s Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea
and the related commentary, which deals with ‘safety of navigation’, ILC, ‘Commentary on the
Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea’ (Yearbook, 1956, Vol 2, 265–301) 280 (ILC Commentary
on Law of the Sea Articles). 135 UNCLOS (n 56) art 21(1)(h).
136 D Osler, ‘Ships Openly Allowed to Carry Arms in Saudi Waters’ (Lloyd’s List, 25 May
2010) (Osler). 137 Florquin (n 30) 209.
138 L McMahon, ‘Insurance Backed Private Navy to Launch Next Year’ (Lloyd’s List,
4 November 2011).
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arrested as either terrorists or mercenaries.139 However, PMSC personnel have
reported that local authorities, usually either naval or law enforcement agents,
will grant unoﬃcial ‘tacit permissions’ to work in the area in exchange for a
payment or bribe.140 Similar occurrences have been reported in Indonesian
waters.141 In other South-East Asian countries, PMSCs may apply for permits
or simply employ local security guards who already have permission to operate
in the country concerned.142 It is reported that this practice is beginning to
emerge in East Africa. This is not without consequence for the costs incurred
by shipping companies.143
In sum, the two questions considered in connection with innocent passage—
whether the use of armed guards constitutes a non-innocent activity and
whether the coastal State is allowed to adopt rules on armed guards on board
ships passing through its territorial waters— cannot be answered with
certainty. As a result of this legal uncertainty, and given that some States do
regulate the use of armed guards on board ships passing through their territorial
waters, diﬀerent practices have emerged to avoid the risk of engaging in a non-
innocent activity or breaching coastal State law relating to innocent passage,
which will now be considered.
C. Practices to Avoid Potential Violation of Law
PMSCs have developed diﬀerent strategies in order to avoid falling subject to
coastal State enforcement measures due to their engaging in a non-innocent
activity or otherwise infringing the coastal State’s laws and regulations. Some
companies apparently dump their weapons at sea before entering waters
subject to a third State’s sovereignty144 and later acquire them anew.145
Another practice used to avoid violating coastal and port State arms regulations
is to use ships or ﬂoating platforms located on the high seas as armouries.
PMSC personnel can thus be armed whilst on the high seas and still be
unarmed when entering the territorial sea of a State.146 The company
Protection Vessels International, for instance, deployed its ship Sea Scorpion
as a ﬂoating weapons hub. According to the UNMonitoring Group on Somalia
and Eritrea, the Sea Scorpion violated the arms embargo imposed on Eritrea147
when it entered Eritrea’s territorial waters carrying arms and ammunition.148
139 C Liss, ‘Losing control? The privatisation of anti-piracy services in Southeast Asia’ (2009)
63 Australian Journal of International Aﬀairs 309, 397. 140 Liss ibid 397.
141 C Liss, ‘Southeast Asia’s Maritime Security Dilemma: State or Market?’ <www.japanfocus.
org/-Carolin-Liss/2444> accessed 22 February 2013. 142 Liss ibid.
143 König and Salomon, Private Sicherheitsdienste (n 61) 15.
144 Florquin (n 30) 210; Osler (n 136). 145 Osler (n 136).
146 UNSC, ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security
Council resolution 1916 (2010)’ UN Doc S/2011/433 (18 July 2011), annex 6.5, 310, para 2
(Report UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2010); Osler (n 136); Brown (n 21) 9.
147 UNSC Res 1907 (23 December 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1907.
148 Report UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2010 (n 146) annex 6.5, 312, para 11.
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This resulted in its being intercepted by Eritrean naval forces149 and four
Protection Vessels International employees spent almost six months in
detention in Eritrea.150
Other PMSCs leap the administrative hurdle and acquire the necessary
coastal or port State authorizations and/or licenses necessary for their arms and
armed guards. Alternatively, they lease state-owned material. Various
governments began to take advantage of the booming PMSC business by
‘oﬀering expensive, customized permits that allow private maritime security
companies to operate from their ports with weapons, security personnel and
equipment and, in some cases, private patrol vessels’.151 States not only
generate income by issuing permits, but also lease out state-owned weapons to
licensed PMSCs.152 Djibouti and Sri Lanka, whose ports are strategically
located on the main shipping routes crossing the area prone to piracy, are
particularly active. Djibouti not only sells permits for PMSCs to operate from
its port with weapons, but it also installed a gun-rental scheme whereby
merchant ships relying on PMSCs can rent arms and take them on board for a
fee. A presidential Decree gave a private entity, the Djibouti Maritime Security
Services (DMSS), authority to control PMSCs operating from Djibouti,
including the transit, rental and storage of weapons.153 DMSS even oﬀers
rendezvous with ships at sea in order to pick up leased weapons from returning
ships before they call at ports not allowing armed guards to enter.154 Similar
services are oﬀered in Sri Lanka, where the State has authorized private
companies to rent weapons to PMSCs. The equipment, which can only be
rented out on the condition that a retired or oﬀ-duty Sri Lankan navy or army
oﬃcer is embarked on the merchant vessel to monitor the use of arms by the
PMSC personnel, must be returned within a month of issue.155 Sri Lanka even
rents out teams of retired or oﬀ-duty oﬃcers to provide security on board
merchant vessels.156
Obviously, enhanced clarity und uniformity at the normative level would be
preferable to these emerging practices (and business models) in order to avoid
a potential violation of coastal State law. Thus, it is commendable that the IMO
agreed in May 2012 ‘to further assist policy development at the national level
and facilitate greater harmonization of policies at the international level related
to the issue of private armed security on board ships’.157
149 Report UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2010 (n 146) annex 6.5, 310, para 9.
150 Report UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2010 (n 146) annex 6.5, 312, para 10.
151 Report UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2010 (n 146) para 179.
152 Report UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2010 (n 146) para 179.
153 Florquin (n 30) 210.
154 Florquin (n 30) 210; Report UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2010 (n 146)
annex 6.4, 305, para 24. 155 Florquin (n 30) 210–11.
156 Florquin (n 30) 211.
157 IMO,‘Interim Guidance to Private Maritime and Security Companies Providing Privately
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area’ (25 May 2012)
MSC.1/Circ.1443, para 3.
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III. POWERS OF PMSC PERSONNEL
In terms of legal issues in need of clariﬁcation, and given the risk of incurring
liability for violating applicable law, taking and having guns on board ships is
perhaps more problematic than their use. It seems that there is a common and
universal understanding that PMSC personnel embarked on merchant ships
can use force in self-defence or in the defence of others. Yet, the precise
contours of their powers are not so obvious.
A. Repelling an Attack
International law does not provide a comprehensive answer to the question of
whether and under which conditions PMSC personnel can use force in order to
defend themselves or others from a pirate attack. Rather, the main source to
consult is domestic criminal law.
It is an almost universally recognized principle of criminal law that a person
who is unlawfully attacked or threatened with imminent attack is not criminally
liable and/or is not to be punished for using (even lethal) force, or for its
consequences, when fending oﬀ the attack. Generally, this ground for negating
criminal liability and/or punishment is also available to third persons acting in
the defence of others, and so this would include PMSC personnel acting in
defence not only of themselves but also in defence of the crew of a merchant
ship.158 However, the concrete objective prerequisites for determining that a
situation of self-defence has arisen—for example, the degree of imminence of
an attack that is required and the legality of preventive self-defence—diﬀer
between jurisdictions. The same is true of the mens rea. Thus, as an example,
the consequences will not be the same across all legal orders should PMSC
personnel take action in self-defence when they are not, in fact, entitled to do so
(e.g. if they had not correctly assessed whether the crew of an approaching boat
are pirates as opposed to armed ﬁshermen or even hostages). Furthermore,
there is no uniformity regarding the requirements for, and constraints upon, the
use of force. Thus, the interpretation of what is a reasonable or excessive
amount of force and whether there is a duty to retreat before using force cannot
be answered globally.159
Moreover, in many jurisdictions a person who engages in an act which
carries a criminal penalty in order to protect a legal interest of his own or of
another from immediate and otherwise unavoidable danger acts lawfully, or is
at least not punished, if, by doing so, he safeguards an interest of a higher
158 See eg Swiss Criminal Code of 21 December 1937, SR 311.0, art 15; an English translation
of the code by the Swiss Government is available at <www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/c311_0.html>
accessed 22 February 2013 (Swiss Criminal Code).
159 See U Sieber and K Cornils (eds), Nationales Strafrecht in rechtsvergleichender
Darstellung, Vol 5 (Duncker & Humblot 2010) comparing the requirements of self-defence in
twelve diﬀerent jurisdictions.
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value.160 This ground for negating criminal liability and/or punishment is in
some jurisdictions called a situation of necessity or a ‘choice of evils’, and the
diﬀerences of approach between jurisdictions in such cases are considerable.161
Apart from domestic law, the right to life under international human rights
law, 162 as well as the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by
Law Enforcement Oﬃcials, addresses the legitimate use of force and ﬁrearms.
However, unless PMSC personnel act as de facto law enforcement oﬃcials,
those instruments do not apply directly. PMSC personnel hired by private
actors and placed on board merchant ships are private persons using force in
self-defence or defence of others and do not qualify as de facto state agents or
organs bound by human rights law or the UN Basic Principles on the Use of
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Oﬃcials. However, it is possible that
in the future governments may hire private armed guards and provide them
with military status in order to deploy them as members of Vessel Protection
Detachments, thus addressing this diﬃculty.163
Soft law on PMSCs, even though also containing substantive rules on the
use of force, tends to refer to the ‘applicable law’ regarding the use of force,
which, as has been seen, is mainly domestic criminal law. Thus, for example,
the ICoC, the IMO Shipowner Recommendations and the Indian PMSC
Guidelines all state that if force is used, it shall164 be in a manner consistent
with applicable law.165
In terms of substantive rules, the guidelines stipulate that as a general
principle PMSCs will/should require their personnel to take all reasonable or
responsible steps to avoid the use of force.166 If force is nevertheless used,
certain principles must be respected. First of all, various Guidelines adopted in
the maritime context emphasize that the primary function of the on-board
security team is to prevent illegal boarding of the vessel and to protect the lives
of those on board, using the minimum force necessary to do so.167 In the ICoC,
the principle of necessity is stated in more general terms given its broader
160 See eg Swiss Criminal Code (n 158) art 17.
161 See Sieber and Cornils (n 159) discussing the existence respectively requirements for the
choice of evils defence.
162 Eg, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
Amended by Protocol No. 11 (adopted 4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 222, art 2; and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, art 6.
163 The Government of the Netherlands mentions this option as a possible future scenario:
Government of Netherlands, VPDs (n 24).
164 In the ICoC (n 48) r 30, the verb ‘shall’ is used while the IMO Shipowner Recommendations
(n 39) r 5.14, and the Indian PMSC Guidelines (n 44) r 6.9, the verb ‘should’ is used.
165 ICoC (n 48) r 30; IMO Shipowner Recommendations (n 39) r 5.14; Indian PMSCGuidelines
(n 44) r 6.9.
166 ICoC (n 48) r 30; IMO Shipowner Recommendations (n 39) r 5.14; Indian PMSCGuidelines
(n 44) r 6.9.
167 UK Interim Guidance on PMSCs (n 43) r 8.3; IMO Shipowner Recommendations (n 39)
rr 5.13 and 5.14; Indian PMSC Guidelines (n 44) r 6.9.
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scope of application.168 The IMO Guidelines to Shipowners and the Indian
Guidelines also refer to the principle of necessity in an abstract way; the Indian
Guidelines specify in addition that necessity must be measured by the goal of
preventing illegal boarding.169 The use of force must further be proportionate
to the threat as it becomes manifested.170 What is more, the use of ﬁrearms is
not allowed except in self-defence or in the defence of others171 in situations
where there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury,172 or in order to
prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving a grave threat
to life.173
The guidelines further aim at operationalizing the rather abstract principles
of avoiding force if possible, of necessity and of proportionality, by requiring
the adoption of rules which provide a graduated approach to the use of force.174
Thus, for instance, the IMO Shipowner Recommendations stipulate: ‘PMSC
should provide a detailed graduated response plan to a pirate attack as part of
its teams’ operational procedures.’175 The example of pro forma rules for the
use of force annexed to the Guidance on the Selection of Private Security
Companies (PSC) of 29 March 2011 issued by The Norwegian Shipowner’s
Mutual War Risk Insurance Association176 illustrates what a graduated
response could look like in practice. After a person has been identiﬁed as a
hostile target, a verbal/and or alternative challenge must be given to him.177 A
verbal challenge will be given by shouting ‘armed security – stop or I will ﬁre’
or words to that eﬀect.178 Alternative forms of challenge includes the use of
radio hails, the ship’s whistles, spotlights and/or ﬂares, long-range acoustic
device, the ﬁring of a parachute ﬂare above the pirate vessel approaching the
victim vessel to indicate that it should change course, or ﬁring a parachute ﬂare
into the immediate vicinity of a pirate vessel approaching the victim ship.179
A verbal or alternative challenge must be given before any warning shots are
ﬁred, unless this would increase the risk of injury and/or death of a person other
than the hostile target, a person on board the victim ship is under immediate
armed attack, or time, distance or other factors prevent an eﬀective verbal
168 ICoC (n 48) r 30.
169 IMO Shipowner Recommendations (n 39) r 5.14; Indian PMSC Guidelines (n 44) r 6.9.
170 ICoC (n 48) r 30; Indian PMSC Guidelines (n 44) r 6.9.
171 IMO Shipowner Recommendations (n 39) r 5.15.
172 ICoC (n 48) r 31. 173 Indian PMSC Guidelines (n 44) r 6.9.
174 UK Interim Guidance on PMSCs (n 43) r 8.4 (read together with r 8.5.) and ICoC (n 48) r 29,
require the adoption of rules on the use of force; the ICoC does not explicitly require that they
provide for a graduated response, but since the ICoC obliges to observe the principles of necessity
and proportionality a graduated response is implicitly required. Indirectly, the Industry Guidelines
(n 45) r 3.6, also require rules on the use of force and a graduated response plan.
175 IMO Shipowner Guidelines (n 39) r 5.13; the Indian PMSC Guidelines (n 44) r 6.9 contains
almost identical language.
176 Appendix to Norwegian PMSC Guidelines (n 46) (Norwegian Pro Forma Rules).
177 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) r 3.1.
178 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) r 3.2.
179 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) r 3.3.
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challenge.180 If a verbal and/or alternative challenge is either not possible or
without eﬀect, initial warning shots may be ﬁred to gain the attention of the
hostile target. They should be ﬁred well above the hostile target.181 If initial
warning shots remain without eﬀect, further warning shots may be ﬁred into
the water in front of the hostile target.182 If the person still continues to
demonstrate hostile intent and/or acts, ﬁnal warning shots may be ﬁred into the
pirate ship’s hull or engine in order to stop an attack; thereby all reasonable
precautions must be taken in order not to injure any person on board the
attacking ship.183 If ﬁnal warning shots do not lead to a termination of the
attack and the PMSC personnel honestly believes that there is an immediate
threat to their life, the life of another person on the victim ship or in the vicinity
of the attack, they may use all reasonable force necessary in the circumstances
to protect themselves or others. This may even include the use of lethal
force.184 While such force can generally only be used after warning shots have
been ﬁred, warning shots are not necessary if they would increase the risk of
injury and/or death to a person other than the hostile target or if a person on
board the victim ship is under immediate armed attack.185 In cases where the
reasonable force necessary to protect life includes engaging the alleged pirate
in open ﬁre and the use of lethal force, PMCS personnel must ﬁre aimed shots
only, must not ﬁre more rounds than necessary and must take all reasonable
precautions not to injure anyone other than the hostile target.186 Finally, a
graduated response requires that lethal force is only used ultima ratio in the
event that the alleged pirate is committing or is about to commit an act that the
PMSC personnel believes will endanger their life or the life of a person on the
victim ship and there is no alternative to prevent the danger.187
Such a graduated response requires certain equipment.188 The IMO
Shipowner Recommendations therefore emphasize that when contracting a
PMSC, shipowners should consider whether the company possesses an
‘appropriate ﬁrearms package’ allowing for an ‘accurate and graduated level of
deterrence, at a distance’.189 However, as we have seen, many PMSCs seem
only to be equipped with a single type of weapon with a maximum range of
300 to 400 metres due to ﬂag or coastal State arms regulations.
180 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) r 3.4.
181 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) r 4.2.
182 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) r 4.3.
183 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) r 4.4.
184 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) r 4.5.
185 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) r 4.6.
186 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) r 4.7.
187 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) r 4.8.
188 Even though not directly applicable, rule 2 of the ‘UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Oﬃcials’ highlights the relationship between diﬀerentiated
equipment and a graduated response.
189 IMO Shipowner Recommendations (n 39) r 5.6.5.
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In sum, PMCS personnel are allowed to use force in order to repel a pirate
attack so long as this is in line with applicable domestic criminal law, most
notably the principles of proportionality and necessity requiring a graduated
response in self-defence.
B. Seizure of Pirate Boats and Handover of Suspects
Another question to consider is whether, in the course of defending the victim
ship from an attack, PMSC personnel or the master of the ship, are allowed to
seize the pirate boat, to hold the alleged oﬀenders, and to hand them over to
competent law enforcement authorities on shore or patrolling naval forces.
Under Article 107 UNCLOS and Article 21 of the Convention on the High
Seas,190 the right to seize a boat on account of piracy is limited to warships and
government ships. Article 45 of the International Law Commission’s 1956
Articles concerning the Law of the Sea is even narrower, in that it limited the
right of seizure to warships. In its commentary on this provision the
Commission stated: ‘Clearly this article does not apply in the case of a
merchant ship which has repulsed an attack by a pirate ship and, in exercising
its right of self-defence, overpowers the pirate ship and subsequently hands it
over to a warship or to the authorities of a coastal State. This is not a ‘seizure’
within the meaning of this article.’191 It follows that private persons are not
allowed to carry out a seizure on the basis of Article 107 UNCLOS. However,
the International Law Commission acknowledged that private persons have the
right to overpower the pirate ship and to hand it over to patrolling naval forces
or competent authorities on shore. From the wording ‘in exercising its right of
self-defence’, it can be assumed that the International Law Commission
understood the right to seize and handover the corpus delicti as a component of
self-defence. Indeed, domestic law generally not only grants a right to self-
defence but also recognizes the consequential right to take the alleged oﬀender
into custody for the short time span necessary for handing him over to the
competent law enforcement authorities.192
What is more, Article 8 SUA Convention193 authorizes the master of a ship
of a State party (but not PMSC personnel) to deliver to the authorities of any
other State Party any person who the master has reasonable grounds to believe
has committed an oﬀence under the SUA. Most piracy attacks do fall within
one or more of the oﬀences described in Article 3 SUA Convention. If the
master of the ship has the right to deliver a person to the authorities of another
State Party, he must also have the implied right to overpower the ship and to
190 Convention on the High Seas (adopted 29 April 1958) 450 UNTS 11 (Convention on the
High Seas).
191 ILC Commentary on Law of the Sea Articles (n 134) 283.
192 Ronzitti (n 23) 43.
193 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(adopted 10 March 1988) 1678 UNTS 221.
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temporarily hold the alleged oﬀender. However, against the current back-
ground that even patrolling naval States which have access to diplomatic
channels are often not able to ﬁnd a State willing to accept the alleged oﬀender
for the purposes of prosecution,194 it might be very diﬃcult for a master of the
ship to do so. It is more realistic for the alleged oﬀender to be handed over to a
patrolling naval State, whose oﬃcials can then also carry out initial forensic
and investigative work. Article 8 SUA Convention does not oblige the master
to deliver a suspected person; rather he is authorized to undertake this ‘private
extradition’.
C. Active Interdiction of Pirate Ships
Today, PMSCs are almost always deployed for protecting merchant ships from
pirate attacks, that is, for defensive purposes. Occasionally, however, the idea
has been raised of providing PMSCs with government authorization to actively
interdict alleged pirates.195 This begs the question whether Article 107
UNCLOS allows for such ‘private pirate hunting’.
Article 107 UNCLOS provides that only warships and ‘other ships . . .
clearly marked and identiﬁable as being on government service and authorized
to that eﬀect’ may seize pirate vessels. As has been seen, a merchant ship with
private security personnel on board is, therefore, clearly not allowed to carry
out an ‘oﬀensive seizure’ on the basis of Article 107 UNCLOS. Seizing a pirate
ship is only allowed as part of the exercise of self-defence.196
Further, a ship operated by a PMSC and having on board personnel
commissioned by the government to actively interdict pirates would also not
qualify as a vessel ‘clearly marked and identiﬁable as being on government
service and authorized to that eﬀect’.197 The rationale of Article 107 UNCLOS
seems to require that such action be taken only by a government ship in the
strictest sense of the term. Limiting the right to seize pirate ships to warships
and government vessels was introduced to prevent abusive seizures and, in
case of abuse, to allow for a clear allocation of responsibility and liability.198
The requirement that the seizing ship is ‘clearly marked and identiﬁable as
being on government service’ serves to demonstrate the oﬃcial character of
194 See eg UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1950 (2010)’ (n 5) para 59.
195 See eg T Richard, ‘Reconsidering the Letter of Marque: Utilizing Private Security Providers
against Piracy’ (2010) 39 Public Contract Law Journal 411.
196 See above at section 3B. 197 UNCLOS (n 56) art 107.
198 SN Nandan and S Rosenne (eds), ‘Volume III, Articles 86 to 132’ in MH Nordquist (ed),
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers
1995) para 107(2) (UNCLOS Commentary Vol III); ILC Commentary on Law of the Sea Articles
(n 134) 283: the commentary on Article 45, on which Article 21 Convention on the High Seas
(n 190) and Article 107 UNCLOS (n 56) are based, reads: ‘the right to take action should be
conﬁned to warships, since the use of other government ships does not provide for the same
safeguards against abuse.’
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these units and their personnel. Identiﬁcation of oﬃcial ships and aircrafts in
turn helps in the allocation of responsibility and liability based on Article 106
UNCLOS in case of unjustiﬁed seizure.199
Since the limitation under Article 107 UNCLOS is on the ship and not
necessarily on the personnel serving on the ship, it might be possible to use
PMSCs to oﬀensively counter piracy by incorporating them into government
forces. However, national law may bar the use of private security services for
law enforcement activities as being incompatible with the State’s monopoly on
the use of force.200
IV. DUTY TO RENDER ASSISTANCE
Even where force in defence of a pirate attack is used in accordance with the
applicable law, pirate ships may be damaged and alleged pirates may be at risk
of drowning. This raises the question whether PMSC personnel or the master
of the ship is under an obligation to rescue the alleged oﬀenders. Various
international treaties contain a provision stipulating a duty to render assistance
to persons or ships in distress at sea.201 Thus, for example, Article 98(1)(a)
UNCLOS stipulates: ‘Every State shall require the master of a ship ﬂying its
ﬂag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the
passengers: (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of
being lost’.202 As the wording ‘any person’ indicates, the obligation to render
assistance includes every category of persons203 and thus also an alleged pirate,
including those who carry out an attack on the subsequent rescuer.
Geographically, the obligation applies to persons in distress anywhere ‘at
sea’ and thus includes the territorial sea, straits used for international
navigation, archipelagic waters, the exclusive economic zone and the high
seas.204 However, the obligation is not absolute and exists only insofar as
rendering assistance to an individual does not pose a ‘serious danger to the
ship, the crew or the passengers’ of the rescuing vessel. The master’s ﬁrst
199 UNCLOS Commentary Vol III (n 198) para 107(7)(b).
200 Thus, for instance, Article 26 LPSP (n 67) limits the use of private security personnel by
federal agencies to speciﬁc protection tasks, which are purely defensive in nature. The list is
exhaustive and does not include further potential services oﬀered by private security providers
described in Article 4 of the draft law, namely the operational and logistical support of armed forces
or security personnel.
201 Dupuy and Vignes (n 57) 416; UNCLOS Commentary Vol III (n 198) para 98(11)(f): Other
conventions stating an obligation to render assistance to persons in distress are: Annex to the 1974
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (adopted 1 November 1974, entered into
force 25 May 1980) 1184 UNTS 3, chap V, reg 10 (SOLAS Convention); Annex to the 1979
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (adopted 27 April 1979, entered into
force 22 June 1985) 1403 UNTS, chap 2, para 2.1.10; 1989 International Convention of Salvage
(adopted 28 April 1989, entered into force 14 July 1996) 1953 UNTS 193, art 10 (International
Convention of Salvage).
202 Art 12 Convention on the High Seas (n 190) is almost identically worded.
203 UNCLOS Commentary Vol III (n 198) para 98(11)(b).
204 UNCLOS Commentary Vol III (n 198) para 98(11)(g).
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obligation is thus to ensure the safety of his own ship and persons on board.205
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that a ship exercising its right
of innocent passage is allowed to stop and anchor for the purpose of rendering
assistance to persons or ships is distress, even though passage must generally
be ‘continuous and expeditious’.206
Another question is whether a master of a ship with armed207 PMSC
personnel on board is under an obligation to assist other merchant ships which
are in distress because of an imminent or ongoing pirate attack. According to
Article 98(1)(b) UNCLOS, all States shall require the master of a ship ﬂying
their ﬂag to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of person in distress,
if informed of their need for assistance. This obligation is not only subject to
the limitation that such a rescue operation can be undertaken ‘without serious
danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers’. The master is, in addition, only
obliged ‘in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him’. However,
what kind of considerations can be taken into account when assessing
‘reasonableness’ in this context remains unknown. However, given that life is
potentially at risk, economic considerations, such as costs incurred by a
shipping company due to a delay caused by a rescue operation, should not be
given too much weight.
The obligations pertaining to the duty to render assistance are either
addressed to the ﬂag State, which is required to oblige the master of the ship to
rescue any person in danger of being lost at sea,208 or directly to the master of
the ship,209 but not to PMSC personnel. Still, they may be bound by domestic
law norms requiring individuals to render assistance to persons in danger.
Under various criminal codes belonging to the civil law tradition, a person who
fails to oﬀer aid to another whom he has injured or who is in immediate life-
threatening danger, where it could be reasonably expected from him, may incur
criminal liability.210
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MASTER OF THE SHIP AND PMSC PERSONNEL
A further issue to consider is the implications of the use of armed guards for
command-and-control procedures on board merchant ships, or more speciﬁ-
cally, who is to take the decision to use force against alleged pirates. According
to international maritime law, the master of the ship has the ultimate
responsibility for the safety and security of the ship. The master remains in
205 UNCLOS Commentary Vol III (n 198) para 98(11)(b).
206 UNCLOS (n 56) art 18(2); UNCLOS Commentary Vol III (n 198) para 98(11)(g).
207 König and Salomon, Private Sicherheitsdienste (n 61) 20, argue that a ship not having armed
PMSC personnel on board might rather not be under an obligation to assist other merchant ships
under a pirate attack.
208 Eg, UNCLOS (n 56) art 98(1); UNCLOS Commentary Vol III (n 198) para 98(11)(a).
209 Eg, International Convention of Salvage (n 201) art 10(1).
210 See eg Swiss Criminal Code (n 158) art 128.
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command at all times and retains overriding authority on board.211 This
principle endures even if private armed guards are on board.212 This holds true
notwithstanding the fact that PMSC personnel, who are often recruited among
ex-marines, potentially possess greater expertise in countering armed attacks.
To ensure that the ship master’s ultimate authority over the use of force is
respected while at the same time allowing private security teams to eﬃciently
counter an attack, a clear command-and-control structure, information ﬂow and
cooperation mechanism on board the ship has to be agreed upon and
documented.213 The UK Interim Guidance on PMSCs, for instance, provides
that the PMSC team should be headed by a security team leader who is
responsible for the operational control, deployment and discipline of the armed
guards, and who reports directly to the master of the ship.214 In cases where a
situation arises which aﬀects the security or safety of persons on board the ship,
the security team leader should be responsible for advising the master of the
ship on the available responses to counter the pirate attack. However, it is the
master that recommends a potential armed intervention and decides when
PMSC personnel are armed and weapons no longer stored.215 The master
should further provide written or oral approval of the course of action to be
adopted by the security team leader; if there is insuﬃcient time to do so, the
master must as soon as possible be informed and the course of action adopted
be explained.216
The principle that the master of the ship has the ultimate decision-making
power regarding the use of force remains true throughout all stages of a
graduated response, beginning with the identiﬁcation of the hostile target,
verbal and/or alternative challenges, various degrees of warning shots, and
ultimately the use of force and ﬁrearms. However, the limit of the shipmaster’s
authority is found in the right of every individual to self-defence. Whether on
land or at sea and notwithstanding any command or control structure, a person
retains the inherent right to self-defence. Similarly, a security team member
211 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, Part B, Rule 4.10. The ultimate
responsibility of the master of the ship can, negatively formulated, also be found SOLAS
Convention (n 201) reg 34, chap V: safety of navigation.
212 See eg UK Interim Guidance on PMSCs (n 43) r 5.1; IMO Shipowner Recommendations
(n 39) r 5.9 (this follows from the reference ‘at all times’); Norwegian PMSC Guidelines (n 46)
rr 7.1 and 8.2.
213 See eg IMO Shipowner Recommendations (n 39) r 5.7.
214 UK Interim Guidance on PMSCs (n 43) r 5.3.
215 UK Interim Guidance on PMSCs (n 43) r 5.4.
216 UK Interim Guidance on PMSCs (n 43) r 5.5. Even though Rule 1.1 of the Norwegian Pro
Forma Rules (n 176) requires that the master retains ultimate control and authority at all times, Rule
1.2 only requires that the security team leader shall coordinate with the master before ﬁrearms are
deployed, save in circumstances where coordination would interfere the armed guards right to self-
defence; to coordinate might be insuﬃcient in the light of the master’s ultimate authority and
control.
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may act in defence of others without being authorized by the master of the ship
to that eﬀect. This is conﬁrmed by various guidelines.217
VI. PURSUING VIOLATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW BY PMSCS AND THEIR PERSONNEL
Various violations of domestic criminal law by PMSCs or their personnel are
imaginable. Private armed guards could respond with excessive force when
defending against a pirate attack. In practice, however, it is the arms as such,
rather than their use, which constitute the greater risk in terms of potential
liability if they are not procured, embarked, moved, stored and/or disembarked
in accordance with respective domestic regulations. In cases where a criminal
oﬀence is allegedly committed, many jurisdictions are potentially competent to
investigate and prosecute the case. It is beyond the scope of this article to
consider these questions in detail. However, two speciﬁc jurisdictional rules
limiting the coastal and port State’s competence to enforce their criminal law
will be considered.
A. The Competence of the Coastal State
Article 27 UNCLOS limits the coastal State’s competence to enforce violations
of its domestic criminal law.218 While it has criminal jurisdiction against ships
bound for, or leaving, its internal waters, Article 27 provides that it should not
be exercised over foreign ﬂagged vessels (including persons on board) merely
passing through territorial waters.219 This provision is, however, subject to a
number of exceptions, including, ‘if the consequences of the crime extend to
the coastal State’220 and ‘if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the
country or the good order of the territorial sea’.221
Even if the possession of arms or the presence of armed guards on board a
merchant ship were a criminal oﬀence under the coastal State’s criminal law,
the consequences of this do not seem to extend to the coastal State if the ship
were simply passing through the territorial sea without making a port call.
Thus, it seems diﬃcult to base the exercise of criminal enforcement jurisdiction
on Article 27(1)(a) UNCLOS. It seems more promising to argue that that the
use of armed PMSC personnel disturbs the ‘good order of the territorial sea’.222
It could be argued that having arms on board merchant ships passing through
the territorial sea enhances the risk that other ships are harmed, either
217 Norwegian Pro Forma Rules (n 176) rr 1.2 and 1.3; UK Interim Guidance on PMSCs (n 43)
r 5.6.
218 From Article 27 UNCLOS (n 56) pertaining to the criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State
over foreign ships follows that the coastal State’s criminal law extends to the territorial sea: König,
Flag of Convenience (n 59) para 37. 219 Guilfoyle (n 119) 11.
220 UNCLOS (n 56) art 27(1)(a).
221 UNCLOS (n 56) art 27(1)(b). The other two exceptions seem irrelevant in the present
context. 222 UNCLOS (n 56) art 27(1)(b).
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intentionally or by mistake. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the mere
possession of arms (as opposed to their use in instances not covered by self-
defence or a situation of necessity)—if this is an oﬀence under the coastal
State’s criminal law—does in fact disturb the good order of the coastal State.223
There seems to be no reason to interpret the term ‘good order’ here any
diﬀerently from under Article 19 UNCLOS, where the mere possession of arms
or presence of armed guards on board merchant ships is considered not to be
prejudicial to the good order of the coastal State.224
Even if the coastal State were prohibited by Article 27 UNCLOS from
enforcing its criminal law, the commission of an illegal act by PMSCs or their
personnel may have consequences on insurance. The fact that a criminal
oﬀence is committed on board a merchant ship may aﬀect the validity of an
insurance policy and/or the recoverability of a claim under a valid insurance
policy.225
B. The Competence of the Port State
By calling at a port, ships subject themselves to the territorial sovereignty of
the coastal State. Consequently, that State’s criminal law applies and it is also
competent to enforce its criminal law against ships lying in its ports and
persons on board. However, since ships are considered to be very much self-
contained entities to which a comprehensive body of law and an enforcement
system applies (that of the ﬂag State) even if they are in a foreign port, coastal
States generally only enforce their laws if their interests are at stake.
Meanwhile, matters solely relating to the ‘internal economy’ of the ship are
left to the ﬂag State authorities.226 The principle that port State jurisdiction is
not exercised in instances which concern purely ‘internal aﬀairs’ which do not
disturb the peace, security and good order in the port was expressed by the US
Supreme Court’s Wildenhus Case in the following terms: ‘Disorders which
disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with
exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb
the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the oﬀenders punished by
the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction.’227
223 König and Salomon, Private Sicherheitsdienste (n 61) 14.
224 See above at section 2B.
225 König and Salomon, Private Sicherheitsdienste (n 61) 15; INCE & Co, ‘Piracy: Issues
Arising from the Use of Armed Guards’ 3 < incelaw.com/news-and-events/news/piracy-issues-
arising-from-armed-guards> accessed 22 February 2013.
226 Churchill and Lowe (n 81) 54–55; EJ Molenaar, ‘Port State Jurisdiction’, The Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online edition) paras 1, 7 and 11 <www.mpepil.com>
accessed 22 February 2013: while this is common practice among States, the theoretical bases to
explain it diﬀer between the Anglo-American and French school.
227 Mali v Keeper of the Common Jail 120 US 1, 18 (1887) [this and other relevant cases are
cited in Churchilland Lowe (n 81) 55].
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The interpretation of the concepts ‘internal economy of the ship’ and
‘interests of the port State’, and thus the enforcement policy, vary from State to
State and evolve over time.228 Certainly, the use of arms by private guards
outside the ship or from the ship against targets lying outside the ship would be
subject to port jurisdiction.229 It could even be argued that the mere presence of
armed guards on board merchant ships in contravention to port State legislation
is not an ‘internal aﬀair’ for the ship. The port State has a considerable and
legitimate interest to minimize the risk in its ports, which is enhanced by the
fact that foreign-ﬂagged ships have arms and security-related material on
board. What is more, the potential violation of import regulations through the
transport of weapons into the territory of the port State230 or the violation of its
customs laws231 may aﬀect the interests of that State and thus justify the
enforcement of its criminal law.
For many centuries, port State jurisdiction has mainly been exercised in the
areas of immigration, sanitation, customs and national security. However, it
has increasingly become to be seen as ‘as a remedy for the failure of ﬂag States
to exercise eﬀective jurisdiction and control over their ships’.232 Against the
background of many ﬂag States not yet having comprehensively regulated the
use of PMSCs protecting merchant vessels, or not enforcing their law, port
States may see it as their role to ﬁll in this jurisdictional gap. Port State
jurisdiction could conceivably be exercised with less restraint in the future and
encompass issues concerning PMSCs on board commercial ships.
VII. THE NEED FOR A COORDINATED AND HARMONIZED LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON THE
USE OF PMSCS
The use of armed guards on board merchant ships does not take place in a
legal vacuum. The matter is subject to a scattering of international rules and
a meshwork of domestic legal orders, which apply cumulatively and/or
consecutively, mainly dependent on the actual locus of the ship. Yet the
domestic laws of the ﬂag, coastal or port States or of the State of incorporation
of the PMSC often do not contain speciﬁc rules on the use of PMSCs. General
rules, such as trade and weapons regulations, do not always provide
satisfactory solutions when applied to private security companies protecting
merchant ship from pirate attacks. These rules were not intended to apply in an
extraterritorial maritime setting where PMSCs ﬁll the gaps that arise when state
naval forces are unable to accomplish the impossible tasks of eﬀectively
patrolling a vast area with limited resources and attaining a level of deterrence
high enough to discourage the commission of serious criminal oﬀences. In the
228 Churchill and Lowe (n 81) 55–6; Molenaar (n 226) para 11.
229 König and Salomon, Private Sicherheitsdienste (n 61) 17.
230 König and Salomon, Private Sicherheitsdienste (n 61) 17–18.
231 Churchill and Lowe (n 81) 55.
232 Molenaar (n 226) para 31.
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light of the deﬁcient regulatory framework governing the use of PMSCs, many
States have initiated legal reform projects aimed speciﬁcally at achieving
comprehensive regulation of the use of private security on board merchant
vessels. At the same time, there have also been attempts at self-regulation by
the industry as well as the issuance of guidance at the international level by the
IMO. From this analysis it seems that there is greater consistency as regards the
powers of PMSC personnel, particularly the use of force in self-defence, than
regarding the procurement, embarkation, disembarkation, carriage, and on-
board management of arms and security-related material by PMSCs. Despite
some congruence, the domestic normative approaches to the use of PMSCs on
board merchant ships diﬀer considerably.
In practice, it seems a daunting task for PMSCs and other actors to identify
in their entirety the rules applicable to a merchant ship with armed PMSC
personnel on board as it passes through waters subject to the sovereignty of
third States and to fully comply with these often diﬀering domestic legal
requirements. Even though the necessity of enacting PMSC-speciﬁc hard and
soft law is uncontested, the proliferation of rules governing the use of private
security on board merchant ships will not reduce the diﬃculty of discerning the
applicable law(s) and the array of diﬀering approaches to the powers of PMSC
personnel and to the issue of arms which they contain. What seems necessary
at this juncture is an eﬀort to coordinate the legal frameworks governing the use
of PMSCs, as regards both the interpretation of existing rules and the creation
of new rules. The international rules which are relevant, such as those on
innocent passage, are scattered, and are currently interpreted by States
bordering the piracy-prone area in an inconsistent way. Regional cooperation
by these States aim at achieving a uniﬁed interpretation of what is understood
by ‘innocent passage’ of foreign-ﬂagged ships passing through their territorial
waters would greatly enhance legal certainty for all actors involved. On the
law-making level, the diﬀerent actors currently involved in drafting of soft-law
instruments on the use of PMSCs should coordinate their activities, as do, for
instance, the IMO and Working Group 3 of the Contact Group on Piracy oﬀ the
Coast of Somalia. Admittedly, the aim of harmonizing the rules on the use of
PMSCs and providing a uniform interpretation of ambiguous legal terms is
ambitious. Not only may it be diﬃcult to integrate disinterested States known
for their low regulatory standards in such an endeavour, but many issues go
beyond the subject matter of PMSCs and involve broader State interests. Prime
examples are the use of arms in territorial waters or the extent to which safety at
sea might be protected by private companies rather than by State forces. These
more general issues may stand in the way of ﬁnding harmonized solutions for
the speciﬁc problems posed by the use of PMSCs on board merchant ships.
Among governments and the shipping industry, the prevailing idea seems to
be that the use of PMSCs is only temporary, that once States and international
organizations either eﬀectively patrol the piracy-prone areas or enhance VPD
capacities, reliance on PMSCs will no longer be necessary. However, in light
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of the ongoing geographical expansion of the areas in which pirate attacks are
occurring, coupled with the growing reluctance of States to contribute to
counter-piracy missions (at least on a scale similar to that seen in the initial
years of the missions), PMSCs may have a long-term role in protecting
vulnerable vessels from piracy and armed robbery at sea. Self-regulatory
initiatives by the shipping industry are commendable but most likely
insuﬃcient. Therefore, it is imperative that States and international organiz-
ations assume the leading role in regulating the use of PMSCs on board
merchant vessels.
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